- NKR_Problem_Solutions-

The OSCE has been specializing in what is called preventive diplomacy. The peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabagh was supposed to be the first in OSCE history. Military peacekeeping has been a prerogative of the United Nations and, in recent years, of NATO. As the first attempt of its kind, the operation in Karabagh will inevitably have its shortcomings.

The small size of the Peacekeeping Force and the limitations of its mandate

The OSCE High Level Planning Group concept for a peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabagh was presented to the 54 OSCE member states on July 14, 1995. It includes four operational options plus two sub-options. Option 1 calls for three battalions and three independent units for a total force of 3560 peacekeepers with 240 peacekeeper observers. Option 2 calls for five battalions for a total force of 4200 peacekeepers with 200 peacekeeper observers. (Options 1A and Option 2A call for аn Advance Deployment Force (ADF) to be forwarded early, but they represent the same force format as Options 1 and 2.) Option 3 calls for four companies for a total force of 1260 peacekeepers with 240 observers; and Option 4 calls for a purely Military Observer mission for some 400 observers with 37S support personnel.[21]
Even if Option 2 is implemented, and the largest planned total force of 4200 peacekeepers is dispatched, this will be a seriously overextended force, since it would be deployed along the more than 400 km borders of Nagorno-Karabagh. This force would definitely be insufficient to withstand any massive military offensive by the Azerbaijani army.
Furthermore, Article 22 of Chapter a of the CSCE 1992 Helsinki Summit final document, entitled "Challenges of Change", states "CSCE peacekeeping operations will not entail enforcement action." This article can easily ba interpreted as a ban against military involvement in case of gross violations of the peace accords. In the event of an Azerbaijani offensive, the most likely option for the conduct of the Nagorno-Karabagh peacekeeping force would be to sit out the offensive, as happened, for example, with UN peacekeepers in Lebanon 1982.

Non-streamlined and decentralized command and control structure of the OSCE Peacekeeping Force

The 30000-strong international peacemaking force in Somalia was paralyzed because of the United Nations' ineffective command and control structure. The forces of different states were acting without proper co-ordination When, for example, General Montgomery, the commander of the American contingent, asked the Italian commander, for backup tank assistance, the latter had to contact Rome for approval.[22] The mistakes of the Somalia peacekeeping force (UNICOM I and II) were taken into account in Bosnia, where the international force (Stabilization Force or SFOR) was placed under joint NATO command.[23] SFOR was acting under the supervision of NATO headquarters, and decisions about engagement were being taken at the military rather than at the political level, that is, very swiftly. Besides, the NATO member states' strategic objectives mainly coincided, especially in Bosnia.
When we consider the proposed Karabagh peacekeeping force, we confront what is perhaps the most flawed command and control structure ever employed in peacekeeping operations. From the military perspective, it would have been most expedient if the Karabakh peacekeeping force operated under the authority of either a Russian or NATO chain of command. In reality, the chain of command of the Karabagh peacekeeping force is the following:

(39) The [OSCE] council/CSO will assign overall operational guidance of an operation to the Chairman-in-Office (the chairmanship is to be on a 6 month rotating basis among one of the foreign ministers of the OSCE member-states - A.A.) assisted be an ad hoc group .... The Chairman-in-Office will chair the ad hoc group and in this capacity, be accountable to it, and will receive, on behalf of the ad hoc groups, the reports of the Head of Mission. The ad hoc group will, as a ruIe, consist of representatives of the preceding and succeeding Chairman-in-Office, of the participating States providing personnel for the mission and of participating States making other significant practical contributions to the operation.
( 40) The ad hoc group will provide overall operational support for the mission and will monitor it. It will act as a 24-hour point of ??ntact for the Head of Mission and assist Head of Mission as required.
...(44) The Head of Mission will be responsible to the Chairman-in-Office. The Head of Mission will consult and be guided by the ad hoc group.
(45) The Head of Mission will have operational command in the area.[24]

It is not difficult to imagine enormous problems generated by this chain of commando It is a well-known fact that the OSCE, due to its basic principle of consensus, is a very slow moving international organization. Decision-making at OSCE is at exceedingly complicated and slow process that requires the consensus of all the participants. Any decision could be vetoed by a single "no" vote from one of the member states. We may compare this reality with the fact that among the participants of the ad hoc group, which is going to be a virtual headquarters for the operation, there would be the representatives of Russia, the USA, and Turkey, states with incompatible geopolitical agendas in the region, who are usually at loggerheads over even seemingly uncomplicated decisions. It is obvious that the Karabagh PKF could only be a most cumbersome and inefficient force.

Karabagh versus Bosnia: peacekeeping dilemmas

The Armenians are often blamed for their mistrust of an international peacekeeping force in the region. Western diplomats, in their bid to persuade the Armenians to rely on and trust international guarantees, usually cite the example of the NATO led Stabilization Force in Bosnia. However, the Karabagh and Bosnian cases differ substantially in the possibilities they offer for a successful international peacekeeping operation.
Unlike Bosnia, Transcaucasia is far from being fully integrated into the NATO political-military orbit. The region is influenced to a significant degree by Russia and Iran, the two regional powers whose geopolitical interests too often confront those of the USA and the West. The region is, furthermore, exposed to the instabilities arising in the Middle East, Russia (especially in the North Caucasus), Central Asia, and the Balkans. Shireen Hunter, an American specialist in Middle East and Transcaucasian politics, is absolutely correct in caning the Transcaucasus a dependent and subordinate subsystem of the international political system, which is highly vulnerable to the dynamics of the international political system, including destabilizing exterior influences.[25] Bosnia and the unstable Balkans at large are in the stable European geostrategic region, fully under the umbrella of NATO military might. The influence of Russia has been almost completely eliminated there, not to mention the influence of countries such as China or Iran. Unlike Nagorno-Karabagh, the peace process in Bosnia is almost devoid of the exceedingly negative impact of big power rivalry.
There is yet another decisive difference between the Bosnian and Nagorno-Karabagh peace processes. After the peacekeeping operation none of the parties to the conflict win be in a definite position to resume the war and win it. The power correlations between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims, the territories, armed forces, populations and the watch and control by NATO, have, if not absolute, then a very good chance of preventing the resumption of the confljct.[26] In the case of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh, the return of the six currently "occupied territories" to Azerbaijan by Armenia without alternative security guarantees to Armenia will completely alter the battlefield in favor of Azerbaijan, and make the resumption of war, therefore, much more probable.

   Thus, Karabagh and Bosnia make qualitatively different kinds of demands on peacekeeping operations. In Karabagh, the difficulties for a peacekeeping mission are much greater, and in the event of failure, Armenia and Karabagh would be major losers.
   Finally, the future of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia itself remains deeply ambiguous. No serious political observer could exclude the withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces and the resumption of hostilities between the old adversaries. A parallel outcome would be a disaster for Armenia and Karabagh, with Azerbaijani forces now in a position to prevail totally in the battlefield as a direct result of the terms of the peace agreement.

Possible compromise solutions to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict After eliminating the OSCE Minsk Group peace plan as unworkable, we are left with only two other previously voiced programs for a compromise solution.
   The first calls for the recognition of Nagorno-Karabagh as an independent state by Azerbaijan and the international community. This would be accompanied by the simultaneous withdrawal of Karabakh Armenian forces from all "occupied territories" except for the Lachin corridor. Under this plan, any future Azerbaijani attack on Karabakh could be repelled with military and diplomatic assistance provided to Karabagh by other states, first of all, Armenia; while the presence of Armenian military forces in Karabagh would preclude possible Azerbaijani aggression or border provocations against Siunik. This proposed solution has been completely rejected by Azerbaijan and is unlikely to be supported by the international community.
   The second proposal calls for a territorial swap. In 1992 a former US State Department official Paul Goble proposed a territorial swap between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a possible solution to the conflict. Under Gobbles plan the southern part of Armenia would have been delivered to Azerbaijan, while the major part of Nagorno-Karabagh, as well as the Lachin and Kelbajar districts, were to be passed to Armenia.[27] As a result, Armenia would have reunited with Karabagh, but only at the expense of losing its geostrategically vital border with Iran and finding itself surrounded on three sides by Turkey and Azerbaiian. This plan is deeply unacceptable to Armenia.

   Yet, a territorial swap of a different sort could serve as a viable solution. A plan under which Armenia would receive Nakhichevan in return for all of Karabagh and the currently "occupied territories" could work. To employ a medical metaphor, Armenia would be cured of its Nakhichevan "cancer" and Azerbaijan would be cured of its Karabakh "cancer". Nakhichevan is larger than Karabagh, if we consider Soviet administrative borders, and Karabagh is richer in natural resources
   Under current conditions, this solution would be vehemently opposed by both Azerbaijani leaders, who retain the hope of regaining Nagorno-Karabagh eventually, as well as by Karabagh Armenians, who would refuse to leave their ancestral lands. This proposed solution would also get a fierce "no" vote from Turkey, since Turkey would lose its 10km border with Nakhichevan and, with it, all hope of ever establishing a direct land corridor with Azerbaijan.
   Neither of these peace plans would be supported by the great powers, since both would require border changes of some sort, creating an additional "undesirable" precedent in international politics. However, the Nakhichevan-Nagorno-Karabagh swap may still contain the best strategic solution to this conflict and should be kept in reserve, especially if all other solutions prove to be unacceptable or unworkable. It is not unthinkable that possible future transformations of the conflict could render this proposal more attractive than it is at present.