1. This chapter is adapted from a longer version published as The Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabagh Conflict and the Strategic Security of Armenia (Yerevan: 1998), (in Armenian).
2. A striking example of such an analysis is provided by David Rieff's Nagorno-Karabakh: Case Study in Ethnic Strife", Foreign Affairs (March-April 1997) 118-32. It is remarkable that the editors of one of the most distinguished western journals on international relations would choose to publish as its first ever article on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict a piece by an author who is utterly lacking in any background knowledge on the region and the conflict. Rieff's, and ultimately Foreign Affairs editors', misunderstanding is overwhelming. Rieff "...wonders about the sanity of some of the enclave's (i.e. Karabagh's) officials" and finds it "incredible" that 1Jmany of the enclave's citizens think the government is far too moderate" (P. 126). In other words, for Rieff, a large proportion of the population of Karabagh is simply insane. This notion is supported by the overall style and the third rate "factual" basis of his work. He goes so far as to denounce the Karabagh Armenians for the suffering they themselves have caused (including to themselves). (P. 121). Rieff's knowledge was acquired in the course of a few days of travel to Armenia and Karabagh and is so limited that he confuses the traditional head-dress of Karabagh Armenian women with the completely different Russian babushka (?. 122). Rieff fails or refuses to understand that the Karabagh Armenians fought to survive and to claim the right to live on their land. If it is insanity to fight for that, then how much more insane, for example, were the US and its allies who transported hundreds of thousands of their troops to the Persian Gulf for an operation, which judged by Rieff's criteria, would be the most irrational of wars? With on outlook like Riff's, all wars throughout history can be blamed on the irrationality of the combatants, and from a moral and philosophical perspective, that is probably orrect. However, such a perspective does not have a place in a political scientist's analysis, particularly when the perspective is applied selectively and opportunistically.
3. Ambassador Presel Testimony on Caucasus Conflicts, Internet, http://usiahq.usis. usemb.se/abtusia/posts/xA1/wwwhpsl.html. Presel's report is extremely biased. He denies the very facts of the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades of Armenia, preferring to call them " ...a series of interlocking trade embargoes ...[which] are crippling all three countries." Presel dismisses as "untrue" arguments concerning the unjust and arbitrary borders drawn by Stalin and the Bolsheviks, saying that "Armenians and...Azeris lived side by side; it would have been impossible for anyone to draw rational boundaries."To illustrate his claim, Presel employs an inaccurate source and claims that in the 1896 census 55 percent of the population of Yerevan District were Muslims," without ever uttering a word about the more than 90 percent Armenian majority of Nagorno-Karabagh in 1920 or about the Armenian Genocide. Presel defines the Sumgait and Baku events of 1988 and 1990 as "anti-Armenian pogroms", while for the battle and liberation of the strategically important town of Khojalu in 1992, he uses inappropriate and much stronger language, "the massacre of Azerbaijani civilians". Presel distorts the chronology and dynamics of events by first saying that the "Azerbaijanis ...were expelled from Armenia", and then indicating that only after that the Armenians "fled Azerbaijan". Presel identifies Shushi as a city "historically inhabited by Azeris", and fails to mention that the city became predominantly Azeri after the massacre of the Armenian majority in March 1920. The Armenian government should have exercised its right to have Presel replaced rather than allow him to continue in his work that would culminate in the now infamous OSCE Lisbon Summit statement of December 1996.
4. My focus here is on "the interrelationship between politics and the threat and use of force, which is the essence of strategy." Ken Booth and Eric Herring. Keyguide to Information Sources in Strategic Studies (London: Mansell, 1994) P. 16.
5. In this respect, as a counter argument, we note the agreement by the American and Russian co-chairs of the Minsk Group. As a matter of fact, this unanimity is merely a veneer that does not reflect in the slightest USA and Russian geopolitical power struggles and "hidden agendas". The peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict can only be addressed through the two levels of the immediate parties and the greater powers involved.
6. January 2?, 1998, Bakinskiy Rabochiy, Baku Worker (m Russian). For a fuller account of this and other analogous statements by President Aliev and others see Arsen Melik-Shakhnazarov, "An Appetite Comes during Lunch", Armyanskiy Vestnik, no. 2, (1998), Moscow (in Russian).
7. December 2?, 1998, Bakinskiy Rabochiy, Baku Worker (in Russian).
8. Caroline Cox and John Eibner, Ethnic Cleansing in Progress: War in Nagorno-Karabakh (Zurich, London, and Washington: Institute for Religious Minorities in the Islamic World, 1993).
9. While no one has yet undertaken a systematic compilation and analysis of Turkish denials of the Armenian Genocide, a point by point rebuttal of denial arguments is found in Vahakn Dadrian, The Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification (Cambridge, Massachusetts and Toronto: The Zoryan Institute, 1999). Also see Roger Smith, Eric Markusen and Robert Jay, Lifton, "Professional Ethics and Denial of the Armenian Genocide", Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 9, 1 (Spring 1995) 1-22.
10. The extent of Turkish propaganda on this issue can be gleaned from some of the titles in the Turkish press; Seize Sengun, "Syria Flies PKK Militants to Armenia", Hurriyet, November 10, 1993 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: West Europe (henceforth FBIS), November 15, 1993, 72; Gorsel Polat, "PKK Will Attach with ASALA in the Spring", Cumhuriyet, December 27, 1993 in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe, January 5, 1994, 29; Sinan Onus, "Intelligence Report Details Armenia-PKK Ties," Aydinlik, January 29, 1994 in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe, February 3, 1994, 36; "PKK Reportedly Moving to Iran, Armenia", Turkish Daily News, February 1, 1994 in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe, February 7, 1994, 44. This sample is found in Rouben Adalian, " Armenia's Foreign Policy: Defining Priorities and coping with Conflict", in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (eds) The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995) pp. 335-6 notes 23, 25-6. An Apri116, 1998 article in the English language Thrash Daily News claimed that Armenia is home to seven PKK bases while Iran has 11, Russia four and Cyprus one.
11. Ed Blanche, "Turkey Seizes PKK Field Commander", Jane's Intelligence Review - Pointer, June 1, 1998.
12. Anatolia News Agency, Ankara, in English, 15:36 GMT, November 11, 1996 See Azerbaijan. Country Report. The Economist Intelligence Report (1st quarter 1997) 10. on April 16, 1998 Turkish Daily News, Interfax and REF/RL reported that meeting in Baku on April 14 with Azerbaijan President Gaidar Aliev. General Hakki Karadayi, Turkish chief of staff, said that the Karabagh conflict must be resolved in such a way that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity is preserved. Aliev termed the conflict a threat to Turkey. The two men also discussed the possibility of deploying NATO forces to protect oil pipelines in the Transcaucasus. General Karadayi praised Azerbaijan as "the star of the future in economic, commercial, and military terms." However, according to Turan, be refused to comment on reports that Azerbaijan is seeking to buy F-16 fighter aircraft from Turkey. The next day, Caucasus Press reported on the talks in Tbilisi between General Karadayi and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze. The talks focused on Turkish financial and technical support for the Georgian military and on the ongoing training program Turkey is offering Georgian army officers. Shevardnadze and Karadayi noted their "common interests" in exporting Caspian oil and gas via Georgia and creating a regional security system.
13. Kenneth Booth, a well-known scholar on strategic studies, wrote extensively about the ethnocentric shortcomings in US strategic thought: Partly because of the dominance of the United States in the development of the subject, it [strategic studies] come to have an ethnocentric flavor, that is, it reflected the culture-bound assumptions, world-view preoccupations and preiudices of the country of its dominating practitioners. The main contributors to the strategic debate were writing primarily with US problems in mind, and they shared a common (American) understanding of the strategic world they sought to analyze and sometimes influence. However, the theory and practice of strategy exists in a multicultural world and multistate world, and there was only a slow recognition of this in the literature. The importance of different national perspectives and of encouraging contributors from beyond the American strategic community remains: thirty years later the subject is still unsatisfactorily ethnocentric ...strategic studies remain, by the best standards of the study of social behavior, an ethnocentic subject ...strategic theory is often a rationalization of ethnocentric bias. Booth and Herring, Keyguide to Information Sources, pp. 9-11, 18. Unfortunately for Armenia, some high-ranking government officials have accepted the view that history has no place in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. This can be attributed to inexperience and the severe lack of qualified intellectual resources in Armenian strategic and foreign policy circles.
14. We note that even the great powers such as the United States recognize the importance of psychological security for their own populations. Roland A. Paul, American Military Commitments Abroad (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973) p. 5.
15. The Caucasian Tatars, Turkic-speaking Shiite Muslims of Transcaucasia, later, during the Soviet period named Azerbaijanis.
16. Azerbaijan President Aliev expressly underlined this position during his January 8, 1998 meeting in Baku with a group of visiting American mambers of Congress (see the relevant report by ITAR-TASS for January 9, 1998). A virtually identical understanding about the course of negotiations had been implied by Ambassador Presel, US Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh, in his testimony cited above: "We are pressing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to make the compromises that will be necessary to forge a permanent peace. The principal problems to be resolved include the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, including permanent guarantees for security; the withdrawal of forces from occupied territory and the return of refugees to their homes; the question of Lachin, the Azerbaijani province through which runs the road between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and the fate of Shusha and other places inside Nagorno-Karabakh that were histolica/1y inhabited by Azeris. (emphasis added)
17. Keiki Vilen, Mike Karie, and Roger Biesel, "Preparations of a Peace-Keeping Mission for the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by the OSCE's High Level Planning Group (HLPG)," May 1996, see in Internet, http.//www.osce.org/inst/organix/conflict5.htm.
18. William J. Durch(ed.) UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 446.
19. Arie Bloed (ed.) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993 (Dodrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 199?) p. 726.
20. Vilen, Karie, and Biesel.
21. Vilen, Karie, and Biesel.
22. Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) p. 119
23. Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Article I. 1(b), November 21, 1995. Until December 1996, the Bosnian peacekeeping force was known as the Implementation Force or IFOR.
24. Bloed, pp. 727-8.
25. Shireen Hunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 20.
26. For details see Armen Aivazian, pp. 54-9.
27. Paul Goble, "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabagh Crisis", The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 16,2 (Summer 1992), 26. Another proposal for a territorial swap appeared within weeks, this time in the liberal weekly. The Nation. 255, 7 (September 14, 1992) 243. For a critique of both plans see Levon Chorbajian. Patrick Donabedian and Claude Mutafian, The Caucasian Knot: the History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh (London: Zed Books, 1994) pp. 29-30.
28. As defined by two leading US specialists in foreign relations law, " An illusory promise is an expression cloaked in promissory terms, which, upon closer examination, reveals that the promiser has committed himself to nothing. Illusory promises make for illusory contracts, and illusory contracts are void."Thomas M. Franck and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and Simulations (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1993) p. 521.
29. See "Framework for the Conclusion of a peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Stationing of Forces" in come David Accords, September 17, 1978. See, with the date in the accompanying map "Sinai: Showing Limitation of Forces Agreement", Annex to The Military Balance, 1995-1996 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).
30. Recognition of the need to establish geostrategically viable borders for states has an interesting precedent in the case of Czechoslovakia. After World War I, the Supreme Council of the Versailles Peace Conference (represented by the premiers and foreign ministers of the five principal powers, commonly called the "CounciI of Ten") granted Czechoslovakia certain territories inhabited by Polish and German minorities in the belief that a more demographically precise border "Would have left Czechoslovakia so entirely defenseless as to be really incapable of. independent life ...". Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 156.
31. Roland M. Paul, American Military Commitments Abroad (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973). Elizabeth C. Roy. U.S. Military Commitments (Washington: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1963).
32. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Sturmer (eds) Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East (Cambridge. MA.: MIT Press. 1997). pp. 1-2, note 1. US-Chinese and Russian-Chinese conflict patterns are described in K.E. Sorokin, Geopolitika sovremennosti ; geostrategiya Rossii (Modem Geopolitics and the Geostrategy of Russia) (Moscow: ROSSPEN. 1996), pp. 93-S, 100-7, 145, notes 62-74. Douglas Johnston, Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: the U.S. Leadership Challenge (Washington: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1996) pp. 45-6, 84; on the common interests of the USA and Russia in containing Islamic fundamentalism. See pp. 18, 95. A recent perceptive analysis in the Economist focuses on geopolitics in the first 30 years of the 21st century. It specifically high1ighted the desirability of a military-political partnership between the USA, Europe, and Russia; see "The Next Balance of Power: a Geopolitical Detective Story", Economist, .346, 8049 (January 3-9, 1998),p. 19. Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, an outspoken representative of the influential Russophobic school of foreign policy has written that sooner or later "America and Europe ...should offer Russia not only a special treaty or charter with NATO, but they should also begin the process of exploring with Russia the shaping of on eventual transcontinental system of security and cooperation that goes considerably beyond the loose structure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). And if Russia consolidates its internal democratic institutions and makes tangible progress in free-market-based economic development, its even closer association with NATO and the EU should not be ruled out." Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books. 1997), p. 120.
33. Currently, the territorial swap of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh remains an impractical, hypothetical alternative.
34. The Military Balance, 1997/1998 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997) pp. 68. 74, 76; The Military Balance, 1995/1996 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995) p. 62. Also, Ara Tatevosian. "Nagorno-Karabagh's New Army of 'Iron Will and Discipline' ", Transition (OMRI) (August 9, 1996) 23.